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Abstract
Deregulation of the electricity generating industry, under way in the
United States as well as in Europe, would yield economies to operate
in a more competitive environment causing improvement of eﬃciency
and the possibility to develop related financial markets to manage price
uncertainty. Electricity spot prices tend to be remarkably volatile as
consequence of extreme weather conditions, therefore there seems to be
suﬃcient price uncertainty to warrant the development of derivative
markets, however it is important to verify whether the underlying spot
market is suﬃciently competitive and well functioning to stimulate the
development of related financial markets. Analyzing the features and
price volatility of European markets which undertook the same process,
as well as Norwey, Germany and Spain, we formulate a simple model
to control the well functioning of energy spot markets in a deregulated
context. The model is tested using Norwegian, Deutsch and Spanish
spot prices over the last two years in order to assess the correct price
formation in competitive operating markets.
Keywords: Electricity market, Price limits, Market Power.
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1 Introduction
Regulatory reform of the electricity sector oﬀers significant benefits in terms
of improved eﬃciency in the production of electricity and in the allocation
of resources across the economy:
• lower prices for consumers;
• improved risk allocation;
• stimulus to economic growth and competitiveness.
Competition in electricity market should improve eﬃciency but at the
same time some market behaviour may cause the price of electricity to be
higher than the short run marginal cost generation. In addition, power
prices tend to be extreme volatile under extreme weather conditions, and in
that case prices become disconnected from the cost of production and may
be driven very high by squeezes in the market due to generation shortages
or transmission disruptions.
Risk sharing instruments, as well as futures and options contracts, allow
cosumers and producers to hedge their price-risk and represent an essential
element of the electricity reorganization process well under way in the United
States and most of the European countries and starting now in Italy. Where
market for electricity power has been established new financial markets have
also been established. Electricity contracts range from long terms (e.g. 20
years) requirement contracts to short term (e.g. one-half hours) supply
contracts.
This paper involves an analysis of the feasibility of establishing an elctric-
ity futures markets at the same time of the underlying spot market in order
to guarantee the development of both markets and to reduce, if not to elim-
inate, the presence of Market Power. The issue of the presence of Market
Power is crucial for the Italian electricity market which has been undertaking
the deregulation process since 1996. Government Authortities are progres-
sively privatizing the State owned Italian electricity producer and supplier,
ENEL, and the on going process should be ultimated within the year 2002.
At present, however, 75% of electricity supply during the peak hours is still
provided by Enel causing a major concern on how spot prices behave. The
question of whether the underlying new spot-market is suﬃciently compet-
itive and well-functioning in order to guarantee the success of a derivative
market becomes therefore an issue to analyze.
The goal of this paper is to investigate the possible approaches to assess
the well functioning of an electricity spot market in order to verify the cor-
rect price formation and the presence of a competitive system. Analyzing
the features and price volatility of European markets which undertook the
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same process, as well as Norwey, Germany and Spain, we show how market
data may provide a useful tool to identify the presence of Market Power
and recognize a competitive spot market. Competition which is not guar-
anteed by the presence of a relatively high number of firms: during most
of the 1990s, regulatory evaluation of short run horizontal market power
focused on concentration measures, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
(HHI) that as shown by Borenstein &al (2002) resulted a poor indicator of
the potential for market power in the electricity industry since the industry
is characterized by highly variable price-inelastic demand, significant short
run capacity constraints and extremely costly storage. In such circumstances
firms with very small market shares could still exercise significant market
power. In this work we argue that competitive behavior may be recognized
by a certain behaviour of prices and volatilies in the market. In such a
context, we formulate a model to set up price-caps for energy spot prices
in order to guarantee the correct price formation and generate success of
futures trading. The model is first implemented and tested using Norwe-
gian, Deutsche and Spanish spot prices data over the last two years, under
specific assumptions as well as the hypotesis of parametric normal distribu-
tion of price changes. Relaxing this assumption will provide a more general
framework an it is currently the aim of an in progress research.
2 Electricity Spot Market
Electricity spot market has specific features which make this market diﬀer-
ent from traditional commodity markets and from other energy products.
Precisely:
• electricity is a homogenous commodity which implies the delivery of
specific amounts of energy units during a certain period of time.- Elec-
tricity cannot be stored, therefore, generation and consumption must
be perfectly matched at all times.-
• The storage of the commodities which are the raw materials used to
produce electricity (mainly fuel and gas) may be performed in order
to realize cross market arbitrage.
• Electricity supply is quite flexible for low levels of demand, and very
rigid for high levels.
The electricity demand fluctuates in a daily and seasonal pattern and
registers a significant lack of elasticity, especially at peak hours, mainly due
to production processes and household consumption. Incorrect estimations
of consumption or generation mean higher prices for those who have deviated
[IAE ’99].
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Electricity demand is also sensitive to economic cycles in the long term,
and shows a high degree of seasonality mainly due to consumption habits
and weather conditions. These factors have a direct influence on prices as
well.-
From other countries’ experiences it can be inferred that electricity prices
are very variable (the main reason is that it cannot be stored) and, as a
consequence, diﬃcult to forecast. They behave in such a way that they
never go beyond a certain floor level and experiment pronounced jumps
returning rapidly, afterwards, to the previous levels. This price behavior
reflects high and low demand hours and what generating units are at the
margin of each of those hours.
Generally speaking, power prices tend to be remarkably volatile under
extreme weather conditions. Prices then become disconnected from the cost
of production and may show high volatility in presence of generation short-
ages or transmission disruptions.
Spot price evolution is diﬃcult to model given the presence of spikes,
one model that address this issue is the diﬀusion process (Geman ’99) with
stochastic volatility
dSt = µ1 (t, St)dt+ σ (t)StdW
1
t (1)
dΣt = µ2 (t,Σt) dt+ y (t,Σt) dW 2t
where Σt = [σ (t)]2 , W 1 (t) and W 2 (t) are two Brownian motions, with a
correlation coeﬃcient ρ (t) , and the terms µ1 (t, St) and µ2 (t,Σt) may ac-
count for some mean reversion either in the spot prices or in the spot price
volatility. Stochastic volatility is necessary if we want a diﬀusion representa-
tion to be compatible with the extreme spikes as well as the leptokurtosicity
displayed by distribution of realized power prices.
The convenience yield is a very relevant factor in electricity consumption,
as the demand side does not want to be without a power supply due to the
damage it would cause to their industrial activities. The experiences of
other electricity futures markets in the world serves, on the one hand, as a
reference how to approach the development of this type of contracts and, on
the other, as an indicator of the acceptance and consolidation of electricity
in the exchange-traded derivatives environm
3 Electricity Derivatives
The advantages of having access to a Futures and Options Exchange are
very clear as it:·
• Provides information on the electricity price term structure to the
diﬀerent periods of time traded, with all that implies for accurate risk
management on energy prices.·
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• Allows the purchase cost or selling price of electricity to be pre-set, or
their respective maximum and minimum limits to be established.·
• Makes it easier to carry out hedging strategies for risk price manage-
ment, thus protecting commercial margins against unfavourable price
movements.·
• Oﬀers the possibility of comparing prices between markets, albeit with
those corresponding to other raw materials or with those of the elec-
tricity spot market. This allows firms to choose the best price and
to carry out arbitrage operations and, therefore, take advantage of
opportunities otherwise not on oﬀer.
• Trading in the Exchange gives futures and options the following unique
features:·
1. Unlike bilateral and forward contracts, these contracts have no
counterpart risk, as the Clearing House insures the financial in-
tegrity of each trade by acting as a middle-man between buyers
and sellers.·
2. The intense flexibility of futures trading allows traders to adopt
or leave a position depending on the moving expectations and
interests of the traders. This is due to the fact that these mar-
kets oﬀer a deep, liquid environment with plentiful and ready
supply and demand. On the contrary, in non-organised markets,
obligations have to be completed on the agreed date or dates.·
3. Seeing prices in real time adds transparency to markets and pro-
motes easier decision-making.
3.1 European Futures Markets on Electricity
Reorganization of the electricity sector has been taking place in the last
decade in several european countries. The main issue raised by this deregu-
lation is the establishment of spot-markets which allow for eﬃcient pricing
in response to the nature of the demand and supply of this commodity.
Demand and supply in the electricity market vary stochastically therefore
market prices for the producer and the consumer show volatility and con-
trasts with the certain world of fixed prices and long term contracts which
used to dominate the centrally organized electricity sector in these countries.
In this context futures and options contracts which allow consumers and
producets to hedge their price risk in the spot market become an additional
essential element of the re-organization process.
At present Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway,
Spain, Sweden and the UK have undertaken succesfully the deregulation
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process. Among these European countries the Scandinavian Pool, United
Kingdom, Germany and Spain have conteporarily introduced the futures
market.
3.2 Norway
The electricity futures market in Norway is managed by Nord Pool. Since
1996, Nord Pool is the power exchange for both, Norway and Sweden, as
the Swedish System Operator acquired 50% of the exchange, becoming the
first supranational power exchange in the world. The last countries to fully
enter Nord Pool have been Finland and Denmark.
Some relevant facts about the Norwegian market are that it was deregu-
lated in 1989 and that all customers - even the domestic ones - are qualified
in terms of being able to choose a supplier. We should also mention the
existence of an important OTC market run by a multitude of brokers and
power marketers such as the companies Skankraft or Energipartner.
The futures market started its activities in 1993 (as a forwards market
until late 1995) with three diﬀerent contracts: base load, peak load and oﬀ-
peak load. Only the first one is listed at present as the other two did not
gather enough liquidity.Nord Pool’s market is based on the trading of months
(seasons) which, as maturity approaches, split into groups of weeks (blocks)
and, closer to expiration (about a month) split into individual weeks.
Futures contracts are mainly financial contracts so physical delivery is
not required in this market.
3.3 United Kingdom
The UK is the European country with longest standing electricity pool (op-
erating since 1990), after its power sector was deregulated in 1989. In the
current year the New electricity Trading Arrangment (NETA) was estab-
lished, NETA is a new wholesale market where electricity is traded forward
through bilateral contracts on one or more power exchanges. NETA provides
central mechanisms which do two things:
1. Help NGC to ensure that demands meet supply An outstanding fact
that should be pointed out is the existence of EFAs (Electricity For-
ward Agreements), a standardized OTC derivative brokered by GNI,
which has been highly traded since 1991. It appears that the UK will
soon have exchange traded derivatives on electricity.
The IPE (International Petroleum Exchange) is finalizing a deal with
Nord Pool so that members from one exchange can access the other ex-
change’s contracts, placing the IPE in an advantageous position to list elec-
tricity futures contracts. The final go ahead will probably be catalyzed
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when the power sector adopts the reform proposed by OFFER (the UK
power regulator).
3.4 The Deursche Market (EEX)
The objective of European Energy Exchange is to become the leading energy
exchange in Central Europe. In future power, gas and other energy sources
are to be tradable at EEX. This range is to be completed by services related
to the exchange, such as Clearing of transactions outside the exchange (OTC
Clearing).
The point of origin is the operation of the German power exchange.
Since Summer 2000 the Spot Market with physical fulfilment on the day to
follow is established. The Auction Market provides the possibility of placing
purchase and sales bids for single hours and bloc bids. The equilibrium
price determined on this market is a market price which is defined by way
of bilateral auction by suppliers as well as by consumers.
On the market of the Continuous bloc trading purchase and sales bids
for blocs on Base Load and Peak Load can be placed.
Second foothold is the Futures Market on which standardized products
such as Futures are tradable. On the Futures Market Month, Quarter and
Year Futures with Phelix as underlying price are oﬀered. By this combina-
tion of Spot and Futures Market a complete risk hedging is possible.
3.5 The Spanish Market (OMEL)
The Electric Sector act and Royal Decree 2019/97, of December 26th, which
govern the organisation and regulation of the electric power production mar-
ket, entrust functions to the Compañía Operadora del Mercado Español de
Electricidad, S.A.
The new law was reflected by the Ministry of Industry and Energy and
the diﬀerent power companies, and has been further developed through dif-
ferent Royal Decrees. From the market’s organization perspective the decree
defined:
• the setting up of a centralized pool where, following an auction-style
system, generation units sell and acquisition units purchase electricity
daily to be delivered the following day. This is the Day-Ahead Market
(art. 6);
• The creation of a new entity, the Market Operator, in charge of the
economic side of the market (art. 27).- The possibility of signing bi-
lateral contracts aside of the central market. These contracts may
imply physical delivery or simply be contracts for diﬀerences (art 19 y
20).- The guaranteed access for all agents to the grid and distribution
networks (art. 33);
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• The creation of the figure of power marketer (art. 3);
• The setting up of diﬀerent intradaily markets (closer to real time)
where positions can be adjusted and even oﬀset.The market started
on 1st January 1998, becoming the first amongst the countries within
the European Monetary Union alongside Finland. FC&M started op-
erations on 8th September 1995, becoming the first Commodities Ex-
change in Spain.
4 Eﬃcient Spot Market
One important assumption in this analysis is that there will be an absence
of Market power in the coming competitive market for electricity. ”..Market
power means that a supplier or consumer has the ability independently to
influence prices by virtue of size or control over an important aspect of the
market, such as access to transmission lines” (Newbery 95) If there is no
market power, then economic theory suggests that prices will faIl to the
marginaI costs of production, and the cost of operating the most expensive
generating plant in operation at any point in time will set the price for
electricity
Under conditions of intense competition, where many producers have
access to customers and engage in price cutting strategies to win market
share, prices could faIl by as much as 24 percent instead of the 8 to 15
percent cited above. However, a price decline of this magnitude wil! not
be achieved unless utilities are able to reduce their costs substantial!y from
current levels and maintain those cost reductions.
The main problem is represented by the fact that at present the Market
Power may still be performed by tha dominant agent which still detects
more than 60% of the total generators.
In such a context what may happen is that the dominant operator may
set up prices at a very low level in the oﬀ-peak period causing the competitors
not to enter the market or gain a steady market quote, on the other hand,
since during the peak hours most of the demand has to be satisfied only
using the dominant agent who may easily set up a very high price with the
aim of covering most of their marginal cost and maximize profit.
The aim of this work is to study a way to avoid the presence of a dominant
agent by imposing some trading behavior and/or Market Authority control
that may guarantee a correct functioning of the spot market and the correct
price formation. A timely monitoring of price dynamics may represent the
initial rquirement for the creation of an electricity spot and futures market
The idea of imposing a price limit on the daily changes that a single
contract price may experience in order to avoid the manipulation of the
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dominant agent is not new in the financial markets where price limits are
currently set up by the Exchanges or the Authority who regulates the mar-
kets.
The idea of imposing a price cap on electricity spot price, at least in the
first years of operation, was provided by C. Wolfram (99) who performed an
empirical analysis based on UKmarket data. She derives price-cost markups
using direct measures of marginal cost and making some assumptions on the
eleasticity of the demand function for electricity.
Wolfram model (1999), based on the traditional economic theory, assume
that a price mark-up may be set using the marginal cost for generator, this
approach may provide succesful techniques in competitive markets or pseudo
competitive, where the presence of several operator is fundamental for the
electricity distribution. In Italy where, especially during the peak hours,
the dominant agent still controls mre than 75% of demand, the collection of
marginal costs for each generator may result pretty useless and not real.
4.1 A simple model
As alternative to the approach provided by C. Wolfram we want to develop
a market based appoach aimed at analyzing the spot price dynamics and
identifying some correct dynamics using only market data. The idea is to
identify a price limit that may represent the price mark-up for the daily
trading which should guarantee presence of several diﬀerent operators.
Simplyfing the assumption of stochastic dynamic and stochastic volatil-
ity for the electricity spot price as described by equation (1) and assuming
a constant volatility may be observed, we derive the following equation for
electricity spot prices
dSt = µdt+ σdWt (2)
Under this assumption we may assume to estimate the probability distribu-
tion, f (∆St) , of daily price changes, ∆St, for each contract, and to set up
a maximum price change ηt such that
ηt = inf {η|f (∆St, η) > β} (3)
where
f (∆St, η) = P {S|∆S > η} (4)
According to the shape of the probability distribution we may set up an up-
per change limit, ηu, and a lower change limit, ηl, to apply to price increases
or price reductions:
uSt = St−1 + ηut (5)
lSt = St−1 + ηlt
that prices may experience in a trading day. In order to avoid the manipu-
lating behavior of the dominant agent Market Authority may use these price
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Figure 1: Average Price over the period Jan-Dec. 2001. Spanish Electricity
Market
limit to monitor the correct behavior of prices. In order to estimate the cur-
rent price limit we need to estimate the empirical probability distribution
for the observed spot prices.
Assuming a parametric distribution (i.e., Normal, Fisher, Gamma...)
may be assumed the change limit ηt may be easily obtained using the ap-
propriate inverse formula for the distribution given by (3) .
4.2 Validation of the model
Using European spot electricity data for the last two years we analyzed the
features and the behaviour of the markets which undertook the deregulation
process and to-day provide a very interesting example of well functioning
futures+ spot market.
We collected daily prices for the Nordpool, the Spanish and the Deutsche
market. For each market we obtained daily prices for each hour contract
that is exchanged. We had daily data from January 2001 to December 2001
for each of the 24 contracts available every day. The contracts to exchange
electricity from 8:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m are considered ”oﬀ peak” contracts
while contracts from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. refer to peak load period.
We analyzed the price dynamic and volatilities for each contract for the
three markets, after testing each financial time series for stationarity by the
Unit Root test. Spot prices, St, resulted I(1) while price diﬀerences, ∆St,
are stationary so we could analyze the distribution features of price changes.
Average prices and volatilities for the period January- December 2001,
for the three markets are described in figures 1-6.
It is interesting to notice how for the Scandinavian market, Nordpool, as
well as the Deutsche market, EEX higher average price and corresponding
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Figure 2: Average Standard Deviation for the period Jan.-Dec. 2001. Span-
ish Electricity Market
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Figure 4: Average Price for the perod Jan-Dec 2001 for the Deutsche Market
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Figure 5: Standard Deviation for the period Jan-Dec 2001, for the Deutsche
Market.
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Figure 6: Standard Deviation for the period Jan-Dec 2001, for the Scandi-
navian Market.
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Nordpool: Daily average volatility 
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Figure 7: Daily Volatility: Peak hours vs Oﬀ peak hours. Scandinavian
Market.
higher volatility can be observed during the period of peak hours while
lower volatility and average price are typical of the oﬀ peak period. This
is to confirm how in markets who have a higher liquidity and competition
higher volatility has to be realized during the period of higher requirement,
witnessing the presence of a large number of agents who may provide dif-
ferent prices for the consumers or distributors. On the other hand, prices
and volatility for the Spanish market, which is well known to operate in a
oligopoly context, seem to have a steady average and volatility to confirm
the absence of a competitive system.
A diﬀerent way to look at the volatility performance is to compute the
average monthly volatility of prices during peak hours and oﬀ-peak hours,
as it is shown in Figure 7. The picture describes the price behavior for
the Scandinavian market and once more it shows higher average volatility
during the peak hours.
The analysis of the price features support our assumption that well func-
tioning of the spot market may be revealed by the price and volatility dy-
namic so an attempt to capture a correct price limit using price distribution
may result a succesful tool.
4.3 Price limits estimation
Given the daily price changes for each of the 24 contracts of each electricity
market we first analyzed the possibility that a parametric distribution, i.e.a
Normal distribution, may succeed in correctly describing the price features
of these markets. Disnormality tests for each of the series were run and the
results show the presence of symmetric distibution, for some of the contracts
we examined, precisely the 9:00 a.m contracts and the 10:a.m. contracts.
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Figure 8: Estimated price limits for the 9:00a.m contract; β = 0.9.
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Figure 9: Estimated price limits for the 9:00a.m contract; β = 0.9.
The other contracts show very little simmetry. As far as for the curtosis
index most of the contracts show a value of the index far from the theoretical
value of 3 with the exception of the 9:00 a.m. contracts which allow us to
accept the Hypotesis of normality only for this contract.
A first attempt to estimate the price limits according to expression (3)
using as probability distribution the Normal distribution is performed us-
ing the 9:00 a.m contracts data and a confidence level β = 0.9. The band
obtained for the three examined markets is shown in Figures 8-11.
It is worth to notice that the assumption of Normality and a confi-
dence level of 90% is not a too restrictive assumption, market price seems
to correctly behave within the estimated band and no intervention from the
Authority seems to be required for the period we considered.
The results we obtained refer to a very simplified assumption of normal
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Figure 10: Estimated price limits for the 9:00a.m contract; β = 0.9.
probability distribution of price changes, assumption which does not seem
to be confirmed for most of the price series we analyzed, at leas according
to the current disnormality test. Even under this simplified assumption
the estimation of a price changes band where the market price may freely
fluctuate and the market Authority may decide to intervene only when the
market price exceeds the upper or the lower limit.
An estimation of the empirical probability distribution may provide a
correct definition of the band for the market price and may be adopted by
Market Authorities to monitorf the well functioning of the market in order
to avoid manipulation performed by the dominant agent.
The aim of further research is therefore to estimate the probability dis-
tribution for the hourly electricity contract of the three european market
who are currently operating in a deregulated context.
5 Conclusions
The crucial issue for the development of well functioning derivative mar-
kets is represented by the existence of a well regulated and competitive spot
market. At present the main electricity Italian producer and distributor,
the ENEL, plays the role of dominant agent owning 75% of electricity sup-
ply during the peak hours. This may cause excessive price volatility or no
volatility at all threatening the success of the spot market as well as of the
related derivative market. In this paper we provide a simple model to moni-
tor price dynamic during each day of trading and set up a ”price limit” that
may represent a useful tool for Market Authority aimet at avoiding manipu-
lation of a dominant agent. The model is tested using market data for three
European Electricity spot markets under simplyfing assumption concerning
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the probability distribution of price changes, i.e. Normal distribution. The
results obtained support the assumption that this model may be adopted
during the initial operating of the spot market by Regulatory Authority to
guarantee a correct functioning of the spot market aimed at stimulating the
development of a derivative market.
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